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MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: PUBLICITY, DISOBEDIENCE, AND THE
REVITAL1ZAT1ON OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
On forty-seventh street in the south side of Chicago there is a large graffiti
mural that depicts an undulating series of seagreen waves. Below this striking image
are spray-painted letters that spell out the following words, attributed to Emerson:
OUR GREATEST GLORY CONSISTS NOT IN EVER FALLING BUT IN RISING
EVERYTIME WE FALL [sic|.' The graffiti serves as a reminder of the various ways
language performs the cultural work of inventing and perpetuating values-values to
which we, in turn, find ourselves deeply and naturally committed. The creation of the
graffiti mural—the spray-painting of Emerson's words and name on the wall--isa form
of cultural practice that also points out the uses of philosophy as a response (however
meaningful or thoughtless that response might be) to social crisis. Taken io its literally
concrete context, the graffitied epigram establishes a cohesive group identity for
individuals involved in an ongoing struggle for social justice—a collectivity or 'we"
whose glory consists in rising every time it falls.
The significance of Emerson's contribution to the revitalizaiion of American
political culture and the expression of political thought both during and after the civil
rights movement becomes more apparent when we recall that Martin Luther King, Jr.
repeatedly and explicitly referred to Emerson in his speeches, lectures, and sermons.
For example, in a classic sermon delivered at the Ebcnczer Baptist Church in Atlanta
collected in the volume entitled Strength To Love, K.ing~in an attempt to exhon his
1
 According to Herbert cobb, owner of Erbo'e Printing and
Copy services, the mural was done on his storefront by graffiti
artist Gregory R, Penrice on February 17, 199 3.
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listeners to harness and master Iheii fears of what they might encounter in their fight
Tor civil rights-quotes Emerson's observation that "He has not learned the lesson of life
who does not every day surmount a fear.*' And in "Facing the Challenge of a New
Age," a I9S6 address before the First Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social
Change in Montgomery, King quotes Emerson's aphorism that "IT a man can write a
better book, or preach a belter sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor,
even if he builds his house in the woods the world will make a beaten path to his door.'
Glossing Emerson, he reminds his congregation that *A..,challenge that the new age
brings to each of us is that of achieving excellency in our various fields of endeavor.
In the new age many doors will be opening for us that were not opened in the. past, and
the great challenge which we confront is to be prepared to enter these doors as they
open.... We must set out to do a good job, irrespective of race, and do it so wetl that
nobody could do it better" (Strength to Lovt, 70).
Kiag's creative interpretation of Emerson registers an acute awareness of the
necessary contingencies of his own time and place: what he discloses in this passage is
the important connection between striving for excellence in any creative endeavor and
establishing rights of citizenship. This insistence that excellence in the act of
invention-whether this act is one of preaching, building, or making a mousetrap-opens
doors onto political life bears a striking resemblance to Hannah Arendt's account of the
public, political space of the Greek potts. King's reading of Emerson makes explicit his
own claim that excellence is assigned to what Arendt describes in The Human Condition
as 'the public realm': "Every activity performed in public," Arendt argues, 'can attain
an excellence never matched in privacy; for excellence, by definition, the presence of
* Mart in Luther King, J r . , " A n t i d o t e s f o r F e a r , " S t r e n g t h t o
(New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 0 9 .
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others is always required, and this presence needs the formality of the public.'1 Bui
whereas Arendt fails to clarify the exclusions built into (his concept of publicity when
she recounts the loss of the public realm for modernity. King's words and the situation
of iheir utterance demonstrate the extent to which, for African-Americans during the
sixties, striving for excellence and thus a stalwart belief in publicncss were necessary
because they represented a crucial means of attaining civil rights. As Seyla Benhabib
has observed, 'The struggle over what gets included in the public agenda is itself a
struggle for justice and freedom."4 Excellence, when performed in public, is a visible
marker of civility that facilitates access to the benefits of citizenship.
King's recourse to Emerson's aphorism 10 designate a means of crossing the
threshold onto the freedoms of public life appears an even more accurate and
compelling response to Emerson's philosophy when we consider this 1855 journal entry,
which forms the basis for Emerson's aphorism published sixteen years later:
I trust a good deal to common fame, as we all must. If a man has good corn,
or wood, or boards, or pigs, to sell, or can make better chairs or knives or
crucibles or church-organs than anybody else, you will find a broad hard beaten
road to his house, though it be in the woods. And if a man knows the law,
people find it out, though he live in a pine shanty, A resort to him. And if a
man can pipe or sing...; or can liberate or intoxicate all people who hear him with
delicious songs &• verses; 'tis certain that the secret cannot be kept: the first
* Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956), 49.
* Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt,
the Liberal Tradition, and Jurgen Kabermaa," Habarmas and the
Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: the MIT Prese, 1992),
79.
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witness tells it to a second, and men go by fives & tens A fifties to his door.
Well, it ij still so with a thinker. If he proposes to show roe any high secret,
if he profess to have found the profoundly secret pass that leads from Fate to
Freedom, all good heads & all mankind aspiringly & religiously wish to know it,
and. though it sorely & unusually taxes (heir poor brain, they find out at last
whether they have made the transit, or no. If they have, they will know it; and
his Tame will surely be bruited abroad. If they come away unsatisfied, though
it be easy to impute it (even in their belief) to their dutness ID not being able to
keep step with his snow-shoes on the icy mountain paths-I suspect it is because
the transit his not beea made. Tis like that crooked hollow log through which
the farmer's pig found access to the field; the farmer moved the log so thai the
pig in returning to the hold, & passing through, found himself to his
astonishment still on the outside of the field....
Whatever transcendent abilities Fichte, Kant, Schelling, & Hegel have shown.
I think they lack the confirmation of having given piggy a transit to the field...
If they had made the transit, common fame would have found it out. So I abide
by my rule of sot reading the book, until 1 hear of it through the newspapers.*
The passage expresses Emerson's hopes for the comprehensibilily and public appeal of
philosophy, and invites us to explore the complex imbrication of philosophy and culture.
Despite his ambivalent affection and disdain for 'common" readers who, like the
farmer's pig, are trying to find the secret pass in his text that leads from Fate to
Freedom, Emerson also values the accessibility and currency of philosophy; believing
that philosophy, like fame, should be heard of in newspapers and otherwise bruited
8
 Emerson In his Journals, ed. Joel Porte (Cambridge:
Harvard University Preas, 1982), 458-459.
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abroad.
Writing in 1968, the year of King's assassination, in the wake of student
uprisings and urban rioting in Newark and Detroit, the philosopher Stanley Cavell once
posed the question of publicity as a question or philosoph y's audience and performance,
observing that "The question of philosophy's audience is born with philosophy itself....
No man is in any better position for knowing it than any other man-unless wanting to
know is a special position. Then what makes it relevant to know, worth knowing?.... The
effort is irrelevant and worthless until it becomes necessary to you to know such things.
There is the audience of philosophy; but there also, while it lasts, is its performance."*
Emerson's practices as a lecturer, even more than his staled interest in philosophy heard
about is newspapers, show his preoccupation with the phenomenon of fame, and the
public performance of philosophy.' Taken together, the graffiti, the sermon, and the
journal entry provide us with an occasion to consider the relationship of Emerson's
ideas to social action—what some might regard as the responsibilities of philosophy to
culture—and suggest just how wide the audience for philosophy can be.
We know that in addition to reading Emerson, King also referred to Thoreau's
' Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Sav? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), xxviii-xxix.
7
 As Philip Fisher has argued, "On a plane beyond Dickens or
Twain, Ernereon had, in the previous generation, created American
philosophy in public as the performance of philosophy and thought
before the lecture hall crowd" ("Appearing and Disappearing in
Public: Social Space in Late-Hlneteenth-Century Literature and
Culture," Reconstructing American f^ i^ erarY History, ed. Sacvan
Bercovitch [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986], 157 ).
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philosophy throughout his writings.' In Stride Toward Freedom, a widely circulated ten
which eventually became a handbook Tor the civil rights movement, King traced the
following relationship between his role as an activist in the 1955 Montgomery bus
boycott and his first exposure to Thoreau's philosophy of civil disobedience:
As I thought further I came to see that what we were realty doing was
withdrawing our cooperation from an evil system, rather than merely
withdrawing our economic support from the bus company. The bus company,
being an external expression of the system, would naturally suffer, but the basic
aim was to refuse to cooperate with evil. At this point I began to think about
Thoreau's Essay on Civil Disobedience. 1 remembered how, as a college student,
I had been moved when I first read this work. I became convinced that what
* For example, King mentions Thoreau's work on civil
disobedience in "The Tine tor Freedom has COBS" in order to explain
the actions and subsequent arrests of a new generation of black
youth comnitted to the freedom struggle (164); and in a sermon
titled "Antidotes for Fear" he refers to Thoreau's journal' entry*
"Nothing is so much feared as fear" (512)* In "The American
Dream," a 1961 commencement address delivered at Lincoln
University, King quotes Thoreau's aphorism "Improved means to an
unimproved end" and glosses it by saying that "If we are to
survive today and realize the dream of our mission and the dream of
the world, we oust bridge the gulf and somehow keep the means by
which we live abreast with the ends for which we live" (211).
Another gloss of the same aphorism appears in Where Do We Go From
Here: Chaoa or Community, published in 1967: "Every man lives in
two realms, the internal and the external. The internal is that
realm of spiritual ends expressed in art, literature, morals and
religion. The external is that complex of devices, techniques,
mechanisms and instrumentalities by means of which we live. Our
problem today is that we have allowed the internal to become lost
in the external. We have allowed the means by which we live to
outdistance the ends for which we live. So much of modern life can
be summarized in that suggestive phrase of Thoreeu: "Improved
means to an unimproved end." This is the serious predicament, the
deep and haunting problem, confronting modern man. Enlarged
material powers spell enlarged peril if there 1B not proportionate
growth ol the soul" (620).
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we were preparing to do in Montgomery was related to what Thorcau had
expressed. We were simply saying to the white community, 'We can no longer
lend our cooperation to an evil system."
Something began to say to me, "He who passively accepts evil is as much
involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without
protesting against it is really cooperating with it.' When oppressed people
willingly accept their oppression (hey only serve to give the oppressor a
convenient justification for his acts. Often the oppressor goes along unaware of
the evil involved in his oppression so long as the oppressed accepts it. So in
order to be true to one's conscience and true to God, a righteous man has no
alternative but to refuse to cooperate with an evil system. This 1 felt was the
nature of our action. From this moment on I conceived of our movement as an
act of massive noncooperation. From then on I rarely used the word 'boycott.-9
For King, the experience of wanting to know and the necessity of knowing
philosophy, as well as his performance of it, Arc shaped by his commitments to public
life. The aspect of King's political philosophy which will be the primary focus for this
analysis is his work on the nature of political obligation and his performance of civil
disobedience in the public realm. In The Human Condition, Arendt describes the public
realm of politics as the space of visibility. She writes, "Everything thai appears in
public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For
us, appearance-something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by
oursclves-constitules reality" (SO). Although, as we shall see, both Emerson and
9
 A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches
of Martin Luther King. Jr.. ed. James M. Washington (New York:
HarperCollins, 1986), 429. Subsequent references are to Testament
of Hope and appear parenthetically.
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Thoreau are concerned with the problem of political obligation, and although Thoreau's
critique of Emerson points up the importance of visible, symbolic action as a means of
publicizing the claims of conscience. King's demand for racial equality is distinctive
in that his performance of philosophy involves a commitment to a scale of publicity and
visibility that involves life-threatening bodily risks. In particular. King's attempt to
put the philosophical ideals of civil disobedience into practice depended for its success
on his high visibility 3J a media star firmly ensconced in a national symbology,
constructed and manipulated in innumerable newspaper and televised images, radio
appearances, and cover treatment by advertiser-financed illustrated magazines.10 The
necessity of this immense media publicity and high visibility associated with King's
performance of philosophy, and the significance of this visibility for his extension of
critical political publics during the sixties," distinguish King's response to the tradition
10
 For an account of how King "became a luminous media
personality whose fane spread to the nation and the world" (29) and
the symbology at cover treatment by news magazines such as lima,
Newsweek, and U.S. Hews and World Report , see Richard Lentz,
Symbols, the Kewa Magazines, and Martin Luther King (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana state University Press, 1990). For a clear, useful
analysis of visibility, public performance, and their implications
for social forces at work in shaping personality in
late-nineteenth-century literature and culture, see Fisher's
"Appearing and Disappearing in Public: Social Space in
Late-Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture" and Hard Facts:
Setting and Fora In the American Hovel (Haw York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 128-178.
11
 In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
(trans. Thomas Burger [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991)), published In
1962, the sociologist Jurgen Habermas sharply criticized the role
of the mass media in creating a sentimentalized, depoliticized,
impoverished, and "faked" public sphere that curtailed the capacity
for rational criticism of public authority. King's contribution to
the proliferation of revitalized publics during the sixties—a
contribution that enlisted the same media strategies deplored by
Habermas—suggests important, effective uses for this "degenerated"
bourgeois public sphere which Habermas himself failed to anticipate
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in American political thought represented by the writings of Emerson and Thoreau. It
is part of the work of this essay to consider the nature of (his response,11 thereby
making the exigencies and consequences of King's critique of the Emersonian tradition
comprehensible to a wider audience of readers and critics.
Or the many recent critical commentaries written about Emerson, two
philosophical responses have a direct bearing on this discussion of King's political
thought, and help to elucidate the tense, necessary embrace of philosophy and politics
in King's writings. The first is 'Finding as Founding: Taking Steps in Emerson's
'Experience," the final lecture io Stanley Cavell's 1989 Carpenter Lecture series.
in his analysis.
11
 Exploring the connection between the hermeneutic and the
ethical in modern thought, Donald Marshall has recently observed
that the problem of responsiveness to the intellectual world may
lead us to question the significance of the "Other": "The
conflict here," he writes, "is the more intense and perhaps the
more irresolvable because the contest is over what 'the Other' is
and how we must stand in relation to it. The accusation that
runs from Kierkegaard to Lsvinas is that those who insist on
understanding are complacent self-deceivers incapable of the
passion of faith. On the other hand, to insist that the 'other'
would be effaced or disfigured by any effort to understand runs its
own risks of self-deception" ("Response to Gerald Bruns," Meanings
in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur. ed. David E. Klemm
and William Schveiker [Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1993),
323-324.) Viewed in connection with this attempt to characterize
King's philosophical response to Emerson and Thoreau, Marshall's
discussion also invites us to consider more broadly the question of
whether and how the social formation of racial "Otherness"
complicates the process of intellectual responsiveness—the radical
reorientation of political thought in King's writings that is
simultaneously a mark of continuity and inheritance.
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collected in the volume This New Ytl Unapproachable America}* The second is Cornel
West's The American Evasion of Philosophy, also published in 1989." Both Cavell and
West show a preoccupation with the meaning of "Amcricaness": Tor Cavell, the attempt
to characterize Emerson's inheritance of philosophy as being "not only Tor himself but
for America" (New Yet, S3), provides a suitable occasion to ask whether the edifice of
Western philosophy has an "American inflection* (Sew Yet, 109); and Tor West, the
project of locating Emerson within the genealogy of pragmatism involves serious
inquiry into "the American heritage" (American Erosion, 4), the possibility of there being
an "indigenous mode of thought* (American Evasion, 5) in America. Both Cavell and
West offer readings of Emerson that reflect their respective projects and stated
prospects for philosophy. Caveil's observation that Emerson's inheritance is figured as
"conversion" (or "transfiguration" or *reattachment")of philosophical terms supports his
claim that Emerson underwrites the defense of proceeding in philosophy from ordinary
language; the fact that, as Cavell has stated elsewhere, Emerson "returns' words to 'the
life of language, to language transfigured, as an eventual everyday.*1* And West's
insistence that Emerson contributes to the pragmatic reconception of philosophy as
" Stanley Cavell, This Hew Yet Pnapproachable America;
Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living
Batch Press, 1989). Subsequent references are to Hew yet and will
be cited parenthetically.
11
 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy; A
Genealogy ot Pragmatism (Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1989). Subsequent references are to American Evasion and
will be cited parenthetically.
11
 Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The
Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 21.
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social and cultural criticism supports West's conception of an "Emersonian culture of
creative democracy* {American Evasion, 235) that underlies his defense of prophetic
pragmatism as "a practice that has some potency and effect or makes a difference in the
world" (American Evasion, 232).
Bui Cavclt's and West's philosophical responses to Emerson differ radically in
their approach to the problem of publicity, and the relationship between philosophy and
politics. For example, C»veil's insistence that (he inheritance of philosophy enacted as
Emerson's rebirth or conversion to America is 'his way of founding a nation, writing
its constitution, constituting ill citizens' (New Yet, 93) prompts Cavell, at the very
margins of his own text, to take up philosophically the question of "the public."
Exploring the problem of whether philosophizing is, or ought to be, also something done
to the world, Cavell maintains that the question "Can mere philosophy do anything?"
(New Yet, 94) should always remain a question for philosophy. On this point, Cavell
aligns himself with Emerson, whom he regards as being at adds with Dewey's
pragmatism: "For Emerson.' Cavell writes, 'putting the philosophical intellect into
practice remains a question for philosophy. For a thinker such as John Dewey it
becomes, as I might put it, merely a problem" (New Yel, 95).1* Indeed, Cavell practices
his own stated methodological preference when, a few pages later, he poses a
provocative, rhetorical question concerning the publicness of Emerson's writing, a
question that invites but does not require the reader's connecting leap between
Emerson's power to demand social transformation and the public realm in which such
'• compare Cavell'a discussion of Dewey and Wittgenstein in
Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: "If what Wittgenstein means by
'bringing words bacJt1 represents thinking, it bears a relation to
words and the world different from that in, *ay, Dewey's
application of intelligence to the world; it may seem its opposite.
I have emphasized its opposite sound..." (21).
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demands are ultimately effected:
The most renowned phrase for what I was calling the power of passiveness-a
power to demand the change of the world as a whole, Emerson sometimes calls
it revolution, sometimes conversion-is what Thoreau will call civil disobedience.
This phrase notes the register of lasting as it appears in a public crisis, call it a
tyranny of the majority. Emerson may seem to confine himself on the whole to
the listing's appearance not at the public end of crisis but at the private end,
call this the tyranny of thinking. Yet he says that he would write on the lintels
of the door-post (in 'Self-Reliance'). Perhaps he is now writing so. Is that a
public place? (New Yet, IIS)
Following his own dictum that the problem of the public-philosophy's audience or
capacity to make a difference in the world-should appear as an enduring, provocative
question for philosophy, Cavell asks here whether philosophy is visibly performed or
invisibly pondered; whether self-reliance is a "revolution* against the tyranny of public
opinion or of mind. Such questions point to the significance of, but do not directly
clarify, the meaning of "the public' as a conceptual resource.
Whereas Caveil's method of provocative questioning broaches the topic of
philosophy's relationship to political culture, in The American Evasionof Philosophy, West
unequivocally advocates philosophy's entry into public life for explicitly moral and
political purposes-as "a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is
put forward by intellectuals in response todisttnet social crises.,.[;]a continuous cultural
commentary or set of interpretations that attempt to explain America to itself at a
particular historical moment" (American Evasion, S). Indeed, throughout The American
Evasion of Philosophy, West's writing is clearly motivated by, and derives much of its
justification and force from a capacious conception of what he identifies in Race
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'the public square'1'--* place not only for rational deliberation, but also fex
expressing love; a realm that includes not only philosophers, but also extends to gay,
feminist, working class, Chicano, Black, Asian-American and third world collectivities,
ill working together in service of 'the public interest.'
The political substance of the American evasion of philosophy is that what was
the prerogative of philosophers, i.e., rational deliberation, is now that of the
pcople-ihc populace deliberating is creative democracy in the making. Needless
to say. this view ij not a license for eliminating or opposing all professional
elites, but it does hold them to account. Similarly, it is citizenry in action, with
its civil consciousness molded by participation in public-intcrest-centercd and
individual-rights-regarding democracy (American E*aston, 213).
West's fundamental difference with Caved in visualizing the relationship
between philosophy and the public realm it reflected in West's interpretation of
Emerson's philosophy as having important consequences for the emergence of Dewey's
pragmatism. According to Dewey, the public (a* distinguished from the social) consists
of all persons who have been indirectly affected by various consequences that follow
from the fact of associated behavior. This public extends to all those affected who
" in Bffce flattera, (Boston: Beacon Preen, 1993), West argues
for the necessity of present-day black scholara engaging In public
life by invoking the concept of « vital "public square": "He Bust
focua our attention on the public square—the common good that
undergirda our national and global destinies. The vitality of any
public square ultimately depends on how much we suit about the
quality of our lives together. The neglect of our public
infrastructure...reflects not only our myopic economic policies,
which impede productivity, but also the low priority we place on
our comnon life" (7).
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require systematic care by the stale." Unlike much of West's later work, which is
devoted to elaborating on the idea of publicity entailed by prophetic pragmatism,19 The
American Evasion of Philosophy does not enr'^re the similarities and differences
" In The Public and Its Problems. (Athens: Ohio University-
Press, 1927) Dewey writes, "the essence of the consequences which
call a public into being is the fact that they expand beyond those
directly engaged in producing then. Consequently special agencies
and measures must be formed if they are to be attended to.... The
obvious external mark of the organization of a public or of a state
is thus the existence of officials" (27).
19
 For example, in "The Postmodern Crisis of the Black
Intellectual," West argues that "It behooves us to think about the
degree to which the waning of public, spheres in this society tends
to displace politics into the few spheres where there is in fact
some public discussion—spheres like the academy. Hence so much of
academic politics 1B a displacement of the relative absence of
serious politics within the larger 'public' spheres where serious
resources are being produced, distributed, and consumed. And so
much of academic politics—in terms of the level of what's at
stake—seems to be exorbitant in a country in which our actual
politics are comical. No real public sphere: we know about the
theatricalization of our politics and the packaged character of our
candidates and so forth" (Cultural studiest eds. Lawrence
Grossberg, Cary Kelson, and Paula Treichler, [New York: Routledge
Press, 1992], 692). In "Learning to Talk of Race," he writes, "The
tragic plight of our children clearly reveals our deep disregard
for public well-being.... One essential step is some form of
large-scale public intervention to ensure access to basic social
goods—housing, food, health care, education, child care, and
jobs.... After a period in which the private sphere has been
sacrilized and the public square gutted, the temptation is to make
a fetish of the public square. We need to resist such dogmatic
swings" {Reading Rodney King. Reading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert
Gooding-Williams [New York: Routledge Press, 1993], 259). And in
"The New Cultural politics of Difference" he calls for a "new
cultural criticism" that will expose the exclusions that have in
the recent past been built into a public sphere, a sphere
constituted and regulated by "immoral patriarchal, imperial,
jingoistic and xenophobic constraints" fOut There: Haralnalizatlon
and contemporary cultures, ed. Russell Ferguson, Martha Cever,
Trinh T. Minh-ha, and Cornel West [Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1990], 35).
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between, on the one hand, West's own concept of publicity thai uodcrgirds his prophetic
pragmatism and role as an organic intellectual; and, on the other, Dewey's vision of *a
discursive and dialogical space wherein various 'publics' can find common ground'
(American Evasion, 10S). Nonetheless, West's commitment to his idea of "[he public'-to
knowing more about the connection between thought and action, and what he clearly
regards as the accessary alignment of philosophical ambition with, felt responses to the
political world-is registered in his dissatisfaction with Emerson's doctrine of
'self-reliance' as a program for social change. Unlike Cavell, West does not read
Emerson's essay as prompting even the question of publicity. He writes, 'Emerson's
nonconformist conception of self-reliance resists mere ideologicalJsupport of capitalist
development. Yet his viewpoint also provides very little substantive opposition to it'
(American Evasion, 21). And: 'Emerson is not a social revolutionary because 'he
believes he is already on the right track and moving towards an excellent destiny.'
Moral transgression essentially consists for Emerson in the exercise of personal
conscience against custom, law, and tradition. It rests upon a deep distrust of the
masses, a profound disenchantment with the dirty affairs of politics and a fervent
defense of individual liberties' (American Evasion, 17).
That "Self-Reliance* should emerge as a key text eliciting such philosophical
deliberation over the meaning of the public is understandable when we consider that
this essay stands as Emerson's best known contribution to a nineteenth-century tradition
of liberal discourse that represents public opinion as a coercive force. At the same time
that (he proliferation of American publics during the nineteenth century created new
political possibilities for individuals, particularly women, who had previously been
Goldman 16
excluded from such institutional sites.10 philosophical inquiry into the subject tended
to demote and finally to denounce the insidious powers of what John Stuart Mill
describes in On Liberty as the "yoke of opinion,*31 and Alexis de Tocqucville once called
the "mistress of the world.""
In his celebrated diatribe against public opinion, Mill is less at pains to describe,
as Tocquevilie does, the etiology, actual operation, and effects of public opinion" than
he is to attack and undermine its formidable power to impose serious, undemocratic
10
 on this point see Mary P. Ryan, Woman In Public: Between
Banners and Ballots. 1625-1880 (Baltimore, 1990).
" John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 8. Subsequent
references are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically.
11
 Alexis de Tocquevilie, Democracy in America, trans. George
Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1969),
4 35. Subsequent references are to this edition and vill be cited
parenthetically.
" In Democracy in America. Tocquevilie insists that public
opinion in the United States, as in any democracy, derives much of
its influence from the fact of equality between citizens. Although
equality is a source of pride and independence it is also,
according to De Tocquevilie, a primary cause for feeling
insignificant and weak: when a citizen compares himself with all
his fellow citizens put together as one vast entity, he is bound to
feel isolated and defenseless in the face of the majority. Thus it
is that in democracies, by De Tocqueville'e account, public opinion
exerts its strange, powerful appeal: "It uses no persuasion to
forward its beliefs, but by some mighty pressure of the mind of all
upon the intelligence of each it imposes its ideas and makes them
penetrate men's very souls. The majority in the United States
takes over the business of supplying the individual with a quantity
of ready-made opinions and so relieves him of the necessity of
farming his own. So there are many theories of philosophy,
morality, and politics which everyone adopts unexamined on the
faith of public opinion" fDemocracy in America. 435-436).
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constraints upon individual liberty. 'It is easy,* he writes, Tor anyone Co imagine an
ideal public which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters
undisturbed and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal
experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which jet any such
limit to its censorship?... In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking
of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself... (On Liberty,
82). For Mill, the only time when public opinion may be properly used to coerce any
member of a civilized community is when such coercion prevents harm to others.
What Mill stresses above all else in his discussion of publicity is the necessity and
importance of addressing the public, the making of private arguments and opinions
public: 'The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions [is]...almost of as much
importance as the liberty of thought itself and~is practically inseparable from it' [On
Liberty, 11-12). A few pages later he insists that "the peculiar evil of silencing the
expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the
existing generation-lhose who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold
it" (On Liberty, 16). And finally, he observes that conformity IO public opinion by even
the brightest of individuals ruins society's chances for self-improvement because all
possibilities of intellectual development and fearless innovation have been effectively
done away with:
A slate of things in which a large portion of the moil active and inquiring
intellects find it advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their
convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the
public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which
they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters
and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort
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of men who can be looked for under it are either mere con formers lo
commonplace, or timeservers for truth, whose arguments on all great subjects are
meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves (On
Liberty, 31-32).
Like Mill's On Liberty, Emerson's writings exhibit a profound ambivalence
toward the public: for Emerson, as for other liberal philosophers, public opinion is both
burdensome and conceptually indispensable in thinking about democracy.14 Although,
as we have seen, Emerson values the fame-making attributes of mass circulation
newspapers as vehicles for philosophy, in "Self-Reliance' he contemptuously describes
"the sour faces of the multitude, [which] like their sweet faces, have no deep cause, but
are put on and off as the -"im! blows and a newspaper directs."" Like Mi l l , Emerson
deplores the extent to which newspapers have become shapers of public opinion that do
away with any capacity for thought that might exist among the masses.** And like Mil l ,
14
As Habermas points out, the demotion of the existing public
by liberal theorists resulted in the constitution of a new, elite
public: "Against a public opinion that, as it stoned, had been
perverted from an instrument of liberation into an agent of
repression, liberalism, faithful to its own ratio, could only
summon public opinion once again" (137).
" Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte
(Hew York: Library of America, 1983), 264. Subsequent references
are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically.
n
 "At present individuals are loat in the crowd," Hill
observes. "In politics it is almost a triviality to say that
public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the
name is that of masses, and of governments while they make
themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses....
[The] mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in
Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their
thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing
them or speaking In their name, on the spur of the moment, through
the newspapers" (63). Mill's stated concern at this point in his
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Emerson believes that custom and public opinion work against the nurturing of precious
individuality; that, as Emerson famously puts it,'It is easy in ihe world to live after the
world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the man is he who in the
midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude'
("Self-Reliance," 263).
In contrast to Mill, however, Emerson does not emphasize the importance of
public address and of making private, original views public. Rather than defending the
freedom of public, published expression, in 'Self-Reliance* Emerson insists that the
rigidity and impediments associated with public opinion will be effectively undone
once it has been rightly conceived of as mirroring private convict ion. Paradoxically,
at the same lime that Emenon'a claim that what is privately true holds true for all men
encourages freedoms of expression, it also obviates what Mill regards as (he urgent
necessity of free, public speaking. By Emerson's account the liberties of public
expression Mill would fight for eighteen years later are there for the taking but
altogether unnecessary, because of this striking and inexplicable, but inevitable
convergence of public and private. He writes, 'Speak your latent conviction, and it
shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,—and our
first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment"
('Self-Reliance." 259).
The curious enfolding of the vocabulary of the public into the private that takes
place over the course of Emerson's essay is nowhere more in evidence than in this
reference to the publicness once aoly borne by the person of the monarch or feudal lord,
now available to every man:
argument is less what he calls "the present low state of the human
mind" per fie than it Is the obstacles such a low state would
present for a government attempting to rise above mediocrity.
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[n history, our imagination plays us false. Kingdom and lordship, power and
estate, are a gaudier vocabulary than private John and Edward in a small house
and a common day's work; but tti; ihingi of life are the same to both.... Why all
this deference to Alfred, and Scanderbeg, and Gustavus? Suppose they were
virtuous; did they wear out virtue? As great a stake depends on our private act
to-day, as followed their public and renowned steps. When private men shall act
with original views, the lustre will be transferred from the actions of kings to
those of gentlemen.
The world has been instructed by its kings, who have so magnetized the eyes of
nations. It has been taught by this colossal symbol, the mutual reverence that is
due from matt to man. The joyful loyalty with which men have everywhere
suffered the king, the noble, or the great proprietor to walk among them by a
law of his own, make his own scale of men and things, and reverse theirs, pay
for benefits not with money but with honor, and represent the law in his person,
was the hieroglyphic by which they obscurely signified their consciousness of
their own right and comeliness, the right of every man ("Self-Reliance," 268).
As Habcrtnas points out, the phenomenon of "representative public ness" that was the
ground of manorial authority in feudal society of the High Middle Ages was inseparable
from the lord's presence and the visibility of his physical attributes-his insignia, dress,
demeanor, and rhetoric-all of which contributed to the endowment of what Habermas
describes as his powerful "aura" (.Structural Transformation, 7)." In "Self-Reliance," the
" Although he notes that sociologically speaking distinct
public and private realms did not exist in the feudal society of
the High Middle Ages, Habermas argues that lordship was something
publicly represented: "This publicneee (or publicity) a£
representation was not constituted as a social realm, that is, as
a public sphere; rather, it was something like a status
attribute.... [The manorial lord] presented himself as an
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primary features of this publicncss inherent iu the vocabulary or kingdom and lordship -
have been fundamentally altered. In Habermas' account, the king's representative
publicity was such that it effectively barred private people from stepping into the
public sphcrc-during the Middle Ages in Europe, he claims, there existed no legal status
that could define such a capacity for translation into the public (Structural
Tram for motion, 5). By contrast, Emerson's description of the publicity, involved in his
notion of "the representative" renders the experience of publicity-the enjoyment of
personal magnetism, the reverence and loyalty of fellow men, and the prerogative to
live 'by a law of his own'-as a right that is democratically extended to'every man."
Setting aside for a moment the unacknowledged exclusions built into Emerson's
concept of representative publicity, at first glance Emerson appears to be promoting
something like universal access to publicity. But in fact he is simply equaling the
private with the public. He tells us that as great a stake depends on private acts as
public ones, and thus what is called for ii not entry into the public realm but rather a
universal assertion of the right lo act as private men with original views.1* The modern,
legal vocabulary of public representation—the language of acts, rights, and laws—has
been saturated in this passage with personal, common sense or everyday meanings. The
effects of such an altered vocabulary are dual and contradictory. At the same time that
embodiment of some sort of 'higher' power. The concept of
representation in this sense has been preserved down to the most
recent constitutional doctrine.. .. For representation pretended to
make something invisible visible through the public presence of the
person of the lard" (Structural Transformation, 7).
" Compare Habermas1 observation that the transformed and
degenerated bourgeois public sphere "becomes privatized in the
consciousness of the consuming public" (Structural Transformation.
171).
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Emerson encourages an original first step onto the path leading to public life, he also
presents a barrier lopublicily and obviates the need for public action because, by his
account, no distinct public realm exists beyond the intimate confines of (he private.1*
Thus he is able to insist, with stunning sclf-nssurancc, that the truest form of
participation in public life is a vanishing from that life; that publicity is best
accomplished by sitting at home. "All concentrates," he writes.
let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause. Let us stun and astonish the
intruding rabble of men and books and institutions, by a simple declaration of
the divine fact. Bid the invaders take the shoes from off their feet, for God is
here within. Let our simplicity judge them, and our docility to our own law
demonstrate the poverty of nature and fortune beside our native riches
('Self-Reliance,' 272).
This same inclarity as to the significance of the public recurs in Emerson's
reference to the visibility of the body. Whereas previously we saw that Emerson
strategically blurs the distinction between the public and the private, in "Self-Reliance"
we are also left with a question as to whether the body is public or social. For example,
when Emerson complains about the conformity that characterizes various "communities
" The same point applies to Cavell's use of the Enersonian
term "constitution" when he describee Emerson's inheritance of
philosophy as a conversion and rebirth into America: "Emerson's
writing is (an image or promise of, the constitution for) this new
yet unapproachable America: his aversion is a rebirth of himself
into it (there will be other rebirths)...The identification this
writer proposes between his individual constitution and the
constitution of his nation is a subject on its own" (Hew Yet,
92-93). This claim, taken with Cavell's observation that Emerson's
"quest was his way of founding a nation, writing its constitution,
constituting its citizens" invites us to consider how Emerson's
notion of constitution (which conjoins senses that are both
personally physical and legal or public) relates to the actual
process and consequences of forming political community.
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of opinion"--describing the uniformity of faces and bodies, "the gentlest asinine
expression" (hat is "the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere*—he does not
indicate whether these parties function as actual political entities or as social clubs
("Self-Reliance," 264). Indeed, the sociality and not the publicity of the body seemi to
be at issue when Emerson describes the physical experience (and not the visible
appearance) of what he calls "the foolish face of praise,' the forced smile which we put
on in company where we do not feel at ease in answer to conversation which does not
interest us. Thus muscles, not spontaneously moved, but moved by a low usurping
wilfulness, grow, tight about the outline of the ficc with the most disagreeable
sensation" ("Self-Reliance,* 264).
Emerson's imagining of the public in "Self-Reliance'-his simultaneous in vitation
and denial of access to a world beyond domestic life--calls our attention back to the
fact, and consequences, of the central issue raised both by West's criticism of Emerson's
essay as providing little substantive opposition to social injustice, and by Caveil's
question regarding the lintel's publicity : namely, whether the liminal act of writing
philosophy is. or ought to be. defined as public action. The debate over whether
Emerson's doctrine of "self-reliance* is or is not revolutionary; over whether, and how,
philosophy may be said to shape or revitalize political culture, takes on an even more
pressing relevance to King's political philosophy when we consider the fact that King's
sermon "Transformed Nonconformist," published in his widely circulated collection
Strength to Loot, does in many respects reflect Emerson's ideas and exhortations IO
nonconformity.90 Indeed, King structures the sermon around what might be seen as the
50
 In The American Evasion of Philosophy, West points out a
connection between King and Emerson, arguing that although King
contributed to the political project of building of an "Emersonian
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most famous and quotable of aphorisms in "Self-Reliance," "Whoso woo Id be a man must
be a nonconformist" (Strength to Love, 12). Unlike Eraenon. who simultaneously
precludes and facilitates access to the public realm, King unequivocally promotes
political action by deploying Emerson's famous mandate for nonconformity to
communicate King's own vision of the social crisis brought about by the deadening
conformity of racism. 'Many people fear nothing more terribly than to lake a position
which stands out lharply and clearly from the prevailing opinion,* he observes.
The tendency of most is to adopt a view that is so ambiguous that it will include
everything and so popular that it will include everybody.... Not a few men, who
cherish lofty and noble ideals, hide them under a bushel for fear of being called
different. Many sincere white people in the South privately oppose segregation
and discrimination, but they are apprehensive lest they be publicly condemned....
How few people have the audacity to express publicly their convictions, and how
many have allowed themselves to be 'astronomically intimidated'! (Strength To
Love, 10)
culture of creative democracy" (235), he himself was not a
prophetic pragmatlot. "The social movement led by Martin Luther
King, Jr., represents the best of what the political dimension of
prophetic pragmatism is all about. Like Sojoumer Truth, Halter
Rauschenbusch, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Dorothy Day, King was
not a prophetic pragma11st. Yet like them he was a prophet, in
which role he contributed mightily to the political project of
prophetic pragmatism. His all-embracing moral vision facilitated
alliances and coalitions across racial, gender, class, and
religious lines. His Gandhian method of nonviolent resistance
highlighted forms of love, courage, and discipline worthy of a
compassionate prophet. And his appropriation and interpretation of
American civil religion extended the tradition of American
jeremiads, a tradition of public exhortation that joins social
criticisms of America to moral renewal and admonishes the country
to be true to its founding ideals of freedom, equality, and
democracy" (23 5).
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Emerson's own formulations of the doctrine ootwithstand ing. self-reliance, as presented
in King's strategic interpretation, implies some public mode of speech or action that also
resists conformity by unveiling the unique distinctness or individuals. In King's terms,
self-reliance as public action promises to bring about a direct confrontation with the
dominant culture that results in 'true brotherhood, true integration, true
persoo-to-person relationships" ("Love, Law and Civil Disobedience, Testament of Hope,
SI), a public realm in which individuals appear to each other, not as physical objects,
but in all their personal dignity and worth.
The critique of Emerson embedded in King's sermon-i rhetorical performance .
that evidently worked to perpetuate 'self-reliance* a* important cultural value
promoting entry into the public realm during the struggle for black liberation*1—is in
many respects similar to the critique set forth in Thoreau's 'Resistance to Civil
Government,' a work published eight years after "Self-Reliance" and which was
foundational to King's developing theory of political obligation and symbolic nction.
In This New Yet Unapproachable America, Cavelt acknowledges Thoreau as 'Emerson's
purest interpreter, no one more accurate, no one else so exclusive* (New Ytl , ti). to
Thoreau's treatise an civil disobedience, the line of this inheritance is clearly etched.
Like Emerson and other nineteenth-century liberal philosophers, Thoreau attempts to
81
 In qlvll Rights and, the Idea of Freedom. Richard King
explores a concept of "8elf-respect" which, he argues, was central
to the political experience of participants in the civil rights
movement: "Self-respect is not just a state of Bind; it Implies
some form of action which transforms self-respect from a subjective
or private certainty into a public truth" ([Mew York: Oxford
University Press, 1992], 72). Martin Luther King's interpretation
of Emersonian "self-reliance" bears a striking resemblance to this
concept of "self-respect" and, as I argue throughout this
discussion, represented a rich resource for the revitalization of
political culture and experience for participants in tho civil
rights movement.
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work against the stultif yiag claims of public opinion. Bui unlike Mill, who argues (hat
private opinion should be freely made public; and unlike Emerson, who insists thai
private opinion will, in ihe end, be universally affirmed in public; Thoreau's writing
is directed against the expression of any opinions whatsoever, when such opinions take
the place of public, political action. Again and again in his essay Thoreau refers to the
urgent necessity of what he calls 'doing": "There are thousands who arc in opinion
opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do nothing lo put an end to them;
who, esteeming themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their
hands in their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing."91 "How
can a man be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy ill" he asks. Even
voting is not tantamount to doing, because as Thoreau puts it "Even voting for the right
is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should
prevail" (Resistance. 139).
For Thoreau, the problem with Emerson's idea of "self-reliance" as a strategy for
resistance is that, like any mere expression of opinion, self-reliance does not stake the
character of the individual; instead, it contributes 10 the illusion that living expediently
in [he world is in fact doing something for it. "The American has dwindled into an Odd
Fellow," he observes,
one who may be known by his development of his organ of gregariousness, and
a manifest lack of intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief
concern, on coming into the world, is to sec that aims-houses are in good repair;
and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect > fund for Ihe
11
 Henry David Thoreau, "Resistance to Civil Government,"
Great Short WprkB of Henry P ? v i d Thoreau. ed. Wendell GlicJe (Hew
York: Harper and Row, 1982), 139. Subsequent citations are to
Resistance and will be cited parenthetically.
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support of the widows and orphans that may be; who, in short, ventures 10 live
only by the aid of the mutual insurance company, which promised to bury him
decently (.Resistance, 140).
Thoreau's dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of self-reliance to effect real changes
in society results in hi* articulation of what he identifies as a 'revolutionary" concept
of performance as public action. He writes, 'Action from principle,—the perception
and the performance of right,--changej things and relations; it is essentially
revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with any thing which was* (Rtsislanet. 142).
Thoreau's emphasis on public performativity represents a critique of Emerson
in two major respects. First, unlike Emerson's 'Self-Reliance,' in which the term
"conscience* is conspicuously absent, Thoreau's account of performance as disobedient,
symbolic action—namely, his refusal to pay his poll tax and subsequent night in
jail-underscores the claims of conscience by stressing the importance of making these
claims visible to the public eye." Thoreau argues that only when these powerful claims
of conscience, as opposed to mere opinion, have been made public, can there be any
possibility of forming a collective identity, a corporation or 'nation* of disobedients.
ID such a revolutionary situation of visibility and publicity, he contends, the claims of
conscience are both privately experienced and shared in public: "It is truly enough said.
" Compare Cavell's reference to the significance of
visibility for Thoreau's project in Haider): "the writer's claims to
privacy, secrecy, and isolation are as problematic, in the.
achievement and in the depiction of them, as any other of his
claims.... This is one way I understand [his] placing himself 'one
mile from any neighbor. ' . It wan just far enough to be seen
clearly.... The withdrawal he depicts in Walden creates a version
of what the Puritan Congregationalists called a member of the
church congregation: a visible saint" fTho Senses of Walden [San
Francisco: North Point Press, 1972], 10-11).
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that a corporation has no coo science; but a corporation of conscientious men is a
corporation with a conscience" (Resistance, 116). Second, whereas Emerson's descriptions
of the body in 'Self-Reliance' blur the distinction between the public and the social,
Thnreau presents the performance of symbolic action as an innovative, visible
vocabulary of the body that publicizes (he claims of conscience.
Although Thoreau's emphasis on symbolic action mark! a significant departure
from Emerson's "cheerful" self-reliance, his model of disobedience still relies for much
of its effectiveness on Emerson's conception of 'the representative man.' For Thorcau,
as for Emerson, the concept of representativeness dismantles individual boundaries and
paves the way for universal identification or 'diffusion of spirit" between persons: as
Emerson put it in his IS JO essay on the "Uses of Great Men," "all touch by tbeir
summits..,. Thought and feeling, that break out I here, cannot be impounded by any fence
of personality. This is the key to the power of the greatest men.-their spirit diffuses
itself" (Representative Men, Essays and Lectures, 631). Thoreau's promotion of himself
as a civil disobedient entails this "representative* status, a status that by definition
involves free access to the public realm. Thoreau's capacity to speak on behalf of
slaves: his moral univcrsalism; and thus his claim to identify and merge his own
conscience with (he conscience of an imagined disobedient collectivity, derive much of
their justification and force from the 'representative" whiteness and maleness of his.
body. Paradoxically, the fact of this physical inconspicuousness—in combination with
Thoreau's genius—grants him formidable powers of visibility, audibility, and thus
publicity in his expression of dissatisfaction with the state.
In her critique of Thoreau's essay set forth in Crises of the Republic, A rend t
denies Thoreau the public status of a civil disobedient because, she argues, his claims
of conscience are inherently unpolitical, and as such can never be made public.
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According to Arendt, "(conscience) it not primarily interested in Ihe world where the
wrong is committed or the consequences that the wrong will have for the future course
io (he world...because ii trembles for the individual self and its integrity.'" Indeed, she
continues, once conscientious objection has been made public, it represents one,
indistinguishable opinion in a marketplace of public opinion where only large numbers
of coinciding consciences will have any political significance. What Areodt LMISK is
that conscience, like philosophy, must first be heard of in newspapers as public opinion
in order to have any realizable effect:
No doubt...conscientious objection can become politically significant when a
number of consciences happen to coincide, and the conscientious objectors
decide to enter the market place and make their voices heard in public. But then
we are no longer dealing with individuals, or with a phenomenon whose criteria -
can be derived from_Thoreau. What had been decided in faro conscientiae has
now become part of public opinion, and although this particular group of civil
disobedient: may still claim the initial validation-their cooicieoces-they
actually rely no longer on themselves alone. In the market place, the fate of
conscience is not much different from the fate of the philosopher's truth: it
becomes an opinion, indistinguishable from other opinions. And ihe strength of
opinion does not depend on conscience, but on the number of those with whom
it is associated (Crises, 67-68).
Arendt's dismissal of Thoreau's premise that the private claims of conscience can be
exhibited in public also dismantles his contention that civil disobedient; should band
M
 Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1969), 60-61. Subsequent citations are to
Crises and will be cited parenthetically.
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together and form a visible, public collectivity or corporation that simultaneously
recognizes its individual, conscientious members and represents, as Thoreau' puts it, a
corporation wi'<A a conscience. Moreover, Areadt's insistence that civil disobedient: are
organized in accordance with the principle of voluntary association denies the force of
Thoreau's attempt to present the appeal to conscience, and the intimate ties of shared
conscience, as a means of resisting the purely volitional, rational, contractual
assumption of obligations that are fundamental to Arendt's specific engagement with
Liberal political philosophy.
Areadt's myopia regarding matters of race, and the significance of civil
disobedience--)he pressing need to believe in the public visibility and efficacy of
conscience-for African Americans in the struggle for racial justice during the sixties,
has been duly noted by her critics. ID a salient critique of Arendt's striking inability
to distinguish between publicity and sociality in the question of racial justice, Scyla
Benhabib has drawn on the example of Arendt's confusion over the problem of school
desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas:
Arendt likened the demands of the black parents, upheld by the US. Supreme
Court, to have their children admitted into previously all-white schools to the
desire of the social parvenue to gain recognition in a society that did not care
to admit her. This time around Arendt failed to make the final distinction and
confused an issue of public justice, equality of educational access, with an issue
of social preference, who my friends are or whom I invite to dinner ('Models of
Public Space," 79).
But in spite of this serious conceptual limitation, Arendt's commentary on
Thoreau does illuminate two significant difficulties faced by King and other civil
disobedients which Thoreau himself does not address. First, that civil disobedience
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depends for its success upon the responsive perf ormancej of others-people who witness,
listen, and believe; who confer visibility and publicity on. the inner, whispered voice of
conscience, thereby making it real. Whai Thoreau does not emphasize, and King's work
on disobedience makes clear, is the fact that the body of the civil disobedient is offered
in the hope that witnesses wilt regard it as authenticating the claims of conscience,3*
As various commentators have pointed out. King's public discourse relies for much of
its effectiveness on an embodied, scrmonic, rhetorical dimension that authorizes and
enacts the claims of his conscience and philosophy of beloved community.** la 'The
Time for Freedom Has Come,' King praised the commitment of black youth to the ciuse
for freedom and their persistent exercise of rights by remarking that They have
of fered the ir ener g ies, their bod ie* to effect th is result' (Testament of Hope. 16 S). I n " A
Gift of Love," King recalls how in the summer of 1966, during the Freedom March
through Mississippi, young gang members who engaged in nonviolent direct action 'were
to be called upon to protect women and children on the march, with no other weapons
Sf
 compare Elaine Scany's claims regarding the
objectification, denial, and falsification of pain in the
torturer's use of the sufferer's body to confer reality onto the
Illusory but (to the torturers and represented regime) convincing
spectacle of power: "As a perceptual fact, [a weapon] lifts the
pain out of the body and makes it visible or, more precisely, it
acts as a bridge or mechanism across which some of pain's
attributes--ite incontestable reality, its totality, Its ability to
eclipse all else, its power of dramatic alteration and world
dissolution—can be lifted away from their source, can be separated
front the sufferer and referred to power, broken off from the body
and attached instead to the regime" fThe Body in Pain: The Making
and Unmaking of the World [New York: Oxford University Prees,
19B5], 56) .
M
 On the performative aspects of King's rhetoric and his
interaction with the audience, see Kqrtln Luther King. Jr.. and the
Sennonic Power of Public Discourse. 5-6,
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than their own bodies" {Testament of Hope, 63). And in his famous 1963 'Letter From
Birmingham City Jail* King defended his use of direct non-violent action as a strategy
'whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the
conscience of the local and national community' {Tenement of Hope. 291). Taken as a
whole, King1! writings and life work disclose his belief that only such a visible, bodily
performance should authorize and make real his claims in creating access to public life.
As one of King's recent commentators has observed, "King was a master of political
theater,""
A second difficulty follows from this reliance on the body; namely, that for
King and Other African-Americans, disobedient entry into the public realm is
complicated by racial visibility and the phenomenology of the gaze.9* We have seen that
the whiteness and maleness of Thoreau's "representative" body grants him access to
formidable powers of pubjicity in his expression of dissatisfaction with the state; and
that for Thorcau, the appeal to conscience derives much of its effectiveness from the
fact that it has been enacted in his political capacity as a taxpaying citizen. In Civil
Rights and the Idea of Freedom. Richard King has observed that "as a representative
man. King's public words and actions revealed something essential about himself and
" £. Culpepper Clark, "The American Oilemma In King's 'Latter
from Birmingham Jail,.1" Martin Luther Kino. Jr.. and the germonic
Power of Public Discourse, eds. Carolyn Calloway-Thomas and John
Louis Lucaitea (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993),
45.
** For a discussion of Frantz Fanon's analysis of the look and
his indebtedness to the phenonenological tradition of European
philosophical thought, see Robert Gooding Willians, "Look, A
Hegrol," Reading Rodney Kt"q. Beading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert
Gooding-Williams (Hew York: Routledge Press, 1993), 164-165,
173-174.
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about the movement generally:*9" like Thoreau, King's success as a civil disobedient
requires that he assume a "representative* status, speaking and acting on behalf of the
oppressed, exhibiting his own exemplary conduct 10 organize and inspire commitment
and disobedient, political action on the part of thousands of men, women and children
involved in the black freedom struggle.40 But in contrast to Thoreau's deft, easy
assumption of a representative status. King's performance as a civil disobedient and
thus his aspiration to Emersonian representativeness involves a dangerous and even
life-threatening situation of racial visibility that has, historically speaking, denied
black Americans access to citizenship and resulted in* pernicious condition of political
invisibility in the public realm.
King's own account of his philosophy of direct nonviolent action shows the
extent la which he was influenced by Thoreau's vocabulary and theoretical framework
for thinking about civil disobedience and political obligation. Like Thoreau. King's
model of civil disobedience represents a critique of liberal ideals that is itself an
expression of his faith in those ideals: 'And I submit," he writes in 'Love, Law, and
Civil Disobedience,' 'that the individual who disobeys the law, whose conscience tells
him it is unjust and who is willing to accept the penalty by staying in jail until that law
** Richard King, Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 106-107.
*° Manning Harable's study of the historical relationship
between religion and black protest thought, and his observation
that King's philosophy of disobedience "provided a theoretical
framework for thousands of committed black men, women and children
to lay down in the streets in protest, to be arrested and
physically beaten by white policemen" supports my claim that King's
success as an activist and political leader entailed his aspiration
to a representative status. (giacKwater: Historical Studies In
Race. Class-Consclouaneaa, and Revolution [Niwot: University Press
of Colorado, 1993], 45).
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is altered, is expressing at the moment (he very highest respect for law' (Testament of
HopeA9). And like Thoreau, King's critique of liberal democracy and (he limits of
contractarianism centers on his broadening of our conception of political obligation to
include both those which arc "enforceable* or legislated and those which are
"unenforceable,* such as the moral obligation to refuse to cooperate with evil. In a 1962
speech titled The Ethical Demands of Integration," King argues that such moral,
unenforceable political obligations are met "by one's commitment to an inner law,
written on the heart" (Testament of Hope, 123). Just as in 'Resistance to Civil
Government" Thoreau calls attention to the efficacy and force of conscience as a source
of political obligations that may not be assumed by acts of consent that are wholly
volitional and rational; so King's writings emphasize obligations that resist the Lockean,
liberal notion that political community is constituted by contract and consent. But
whereas Thoreau's essay makes visible the obligations associated with his individual act
of conscience. King's writings explore the political ties that arise out of the
disobedieot's capacity to love.
The centrality of love to King's conception of disobedience registers a crucial
difference between, on the one hand, the lies of loving obligation that bind together
King's idea of a beloved community, and on the other, the coincidence of consciences
that is the governing principle for group cohesion in Thoreau's model of
disobedience—as one commentator has noted, "King's conception of the nature and
power of love is probably his greatest singular contribution to...American social
philosophy.*41 By King's own account, the love ethic reflected in his vision of a
'beloved community" as the aftermath of resistance was fundamental to the acts of
41
 Ervin Smith, Ttl»? Ethlc3 of Martin Luther Kino. Jr. (N«w
York; Tha Edwin Mollen Press, 1981), 61.
Goldman 3S
disobedience promulgated by the student movement." "Now when the students talk
about love," he observes, "certainly they are not talking about emotional bosh, they are
not talking aboul merely a sentimental outpouring; they're talking about something
much deeper..." ("Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience," Testament of Hope, 46). And: "To
retaliate with hate and bitterness would do nothing but intensify the hate in the world.
Along the way of life, someone must have sense enough and morality enough to cut off
the chain of hate, This can be done only by projecting the ethics of tove to the center
of our lives" ("Nonviolence and Racial Justice,* Teslament of Hope, 8).
The critique of liberal ideals undertaken in King's writings was central to his
ongoing attempt to bring together a bifacial coalition demanding civil rights and basic
structural changes within American society. His death was a devastating loss to the
cause for racial freedom in this country, one which threatened the cohesiveness and
thus the political efficacy of further reform movements. But in the United States, at.
least, the consequences of King's philosophy remain, and have shaped some of our most
cherished theoretical premises in the current debate over the uses and justification of
defensive violence on the one hand, and on the other a desire to believe in the political
efficacy of civil disobedience and love. As Cornel West put it in 1990,
King believed in the fundamental trustworthiness of human existence, that
creation was essentially good and only existentially evil.... This trust presupposes
that the unearned suffering of agapic nonviolent registers can educate.
43
 For a discussion of King's devotion to the ideal of a
beloved community, and aspects of its theological and philosophical
foundations (including Personal ism, Evangelical Liberalism, and the
influence of Niebuhr, Royce, and Rauschenbusch), see Kenneth L.
Smith, jiearch for the Beloved. Copununlty; The Thinking of Martin
Luther King. Jr. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986); and
Ira G. Zepp, The social Vision of Martin Luther King. Jr.
(Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989), 207-234.
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transform, and even convert one's opponents.,.. And if one conclude] that no such
development is possibk--that the adversary not only has DO moral sense or
conscience but, in addition, no longer even has the capacity to develop one-then
we are forced to admit that we are doomed to an unending cycle of violence and
oppression, that human history is the slaughterhouse that Hegel said it was, with
the old victims of violence soon to become the new perpetrators of violence.
That's the nightmare that hangs in King's closet.49
King's performance and critique of American philosophy not only broadens our
theoretical vocabulary for describing publicity and political obligation; it also forms
the basis for SD innovative,ongoing critique undertaken in literatures of protest written
in the wake of sixties activism. Many of the doubts and hopes raised by King's
philosophy—his abiding faith in the political efficacy of civil disobedience and
love-have, in turn, led to a reassessment and response on the part of African-American
poets and novelists interested in developing what might be called, for lack of a better
term, a poetics of disobedience. This poetics-which clearly exhibits the impact of
King's involvement in the civil rights movement and critique of the American political
" West, "The Religious Foundations of the Thought of Martin
Luther King, Jr.," We Shall OvercoinQt Martin Luther King. Jr.. and
the Black Freedom Struggle, ed. Pater J. Albert and Ronald Hoffman
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 127. The terms of this debate
are much the same as they were in 1971 when Hanes Walton, Jr. wrote
the following criticisms of King's views on love: "King stressed
that one is able to love a person while hating the deeds of that
person. But how much of a person can actually be separated from
his actions? And who, if not that person, is to be held
responsible for those actions?....On these recurrent questions
King's philosophy is silent.... To impose a pure love ethic in a
realm where, at best, only relative justice can be attained ie a
Utopian attempt" (The Political Philosophy Of Martin Luther Klner.
Jr. [Westport": Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971], 80).
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tradition—is one that explores the limits and expressive possibilities of King's
philosophical framework, and allows each writer to grapple with the conceptual
premises of disobedience and arrive at a unique formulation of prospects for entry into
the public realm. Examples range from Toni Cade Bambara's The Sail Eaters, which
examines tensions wiihin black activist groups during the Carter administration and
elaborates on the trauma, and need for healing, experienced by black women as a result
of their entry into public life;44 to ihe novel Beloved, in which toni Morrison's portrait
of Baby Suggs may be read as a celebration and critique of King's vision of beloved
community—his emphasis on the importance of lave in working against nihilism and
contributing to a sense of agency end hope among oppressed people.41 Even nationalist
** In this novel, Bambara alludes to Ralph Ellison's analysis
of invisibility and the complications it presents for entry into
public life; the fact that, in the words of one character, "Your
true nature invisible because you're in some incongruous cjetup or
in some incongruous place or the looker's got incongruous eyes.1*
Even more central to Barbara's project is her vivid detailing of
the public appeal and inadequacies of what she describes as a
derivative, contemporary black leadership: "Some leader. Ha
looked a bit like King, had a delivery similar to Ma Icon's, dressed
like Stokely, had glasses like Rap, but she'd never heard him say
anything useful or offensive. But what a voice. And what a good
press agent. And the people had bought him. What a disaster. But
what a voice1* 'The Salt Eaters mew York: Random House, 1980],
158, 35).
** In Race Matters. West refers to Toni Morrison's Beloved in
order to elaborate on the significance of love for the development
of what he calls "a politics of conversion" that will work against
the threat of nihilism in black America. "A love sthic has nothing
to do with sentimental feelingB or tribal connections," he writes.
"Rather it is a last attempt at generating a sense of agency among
a downtrodden people... Por ay purposes here, Beloved can be
construed as bringing together the loving yet critical affirmation
of black humanity found in the best of black nationalist movements,
the perennial hope against hope for trans-racial coalition in
progressive movements, and the painful struggle for self-affIrving
sanity in a history in which the nihilistic threat seems
insurmountable" (19).
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poems, by Amiri Baraka and Nikki Giovanni assert a distinctive black identity and
cultural formation only insofar as the/confront the rhetorical problem of constructing
a "representative,* public position from which to articulate a disobedient call to
revolution-^ poetic project that reflects the legacy of King's work on disobedience and
critique of American philosophy." And Alice Walker's novel Meridian examines both
the uses and the inadequacies of King's philosophy by detailing moral contradictions
and conflicting allegiances involved ia either the commitment to love as a force for
social change, or the decision to kill Tor the Revolution.47 I want to conclude by briefly
** Consider, for example, Baraka's "SOS" In which the he
modulates from a revolutionary, public, "representative" call for
cohesion and political action voiced over radio waves to the
personal invitation to come on in extended in the poem's concluding
lines:
Calling black people
Call all black people, man woman, child
Wherever you are, calling you, urgent, come in
Black People, cose in, wherever you are, urgent, calling
you, calling all black people
calling all black people, cone in, black people, come
on in (The Black Poets, ed. Dudley Randall, [Hew York:
Bantam Books], 181).
And in Hikki Giovanni's "The Funeral of Martin Luther
King, Jr.," the tragedy of King's death and the writing of his
words on a tombstone are transformed into a collective,
articulate, motivated rage that works towards the imagining
and construction of a better world:
His headstone said
FREE AT LAST, FREE AT LAST
But death is a slave's freedom
we seek the freedom of free men
And the construction of a world
Where Martin Luther King could have lived and
preached non-violence fThe Black Poets, ed. Dudley
Randall, [New York: Bantam Books], 323).
" Alice Walker, Meridian (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.,
1976). subsequent references are to this edition and will be cited
parenthetically.
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elaborating on Walker's example, because it offers a direct clarification of what 1 am
identifying as one major consequence of King's response to ihe American philosophical
tradition; namely, the critique of King's framework registered as a persistent
engagement with the vocabulary or rights and an innovative poetics of disobedience
developed in works by contemporary African-American authors and poets.
In a scries of essays and addresses collected in the volume In Search of Out
Mothers' Gardens. Walker assesses King's impact as a leader in the black community as
well as his significance for.Walker's own development as a writer. What is particularly
striking about Walker's analysis is the extent to which she dwells on the fact of King's
visibility and publicity. For example, in a 1967 essay titled 'The Civil Rights
Movement: What Good Wag It?" she recalls that the first time she ever saw King was
when his arrest was shown on a television news broadcast: "Si*, years ago," she recalls
"after half-heartedly watching my mother's soap operas and wondering whether there
wasn't something more to be asked of life, the Civil Rights Movement came into my life.
Like a goad omen for the future, the face of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was the first
black face I saw on our new television screen. And, ax in a fairy tale, my soul was
stirred by the meaning for me of his mission...and I fell in love with the sober and
determined face of the Movement."" And in "Choice: A Tribute to Martin Luther
King, Jr.," an address delivered five years later, she deliberately underscores this fact
of King's overwhelming publicity and life-threatening visibility—attributes which, as
we have seen, were essential to the success of his ongoing attempt to practice the ideals
of his revolutionary philosophy.
" Alice Walker, Ip Seargp of Our Withers' Gardens (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovlch, 1983), 124.
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The public acts or Dr. King you know. They are visible all around you. His
voice you would recognize sooner than any other voice you have heard this
century—this in spite of the fact that certain municipal libraries, like the one in
downtown Jackson, do not carry recordings of his speeches, and the librarians
chuckle cruelly when asked why they do not.
You know, i f you have read his books, thai his is • complex and revolutionary
philosophy that few people are capable of understanding fully or have the
patience to embody in themselves. Which is our weakness, which is our loss.4*
** Walker, In Search of our Mothers' Gardens. 144. Another,
much more recent analysis of the overall Impact of King* n media
publicity may be found in Henry Louis Gates Jr.' e recent memoir,
Colored People (Hev York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). Gates recalls
the tortuous experience of watching TV and then arguing about King
and the Movement with his father: ' Daddy was jaundiced about the
civil rights movement, and especially about the Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.... Sonetines he* d just mention King to get a rise
from me, to make a sagging evening more interesting, to aee if I
had learned anything real yet, to see how long I could think up
counter arguments before getting so mad that my face would turn
purple. I think he just liked the color purple on my face, liked
producing it there1 (26). In contrast to Walker (to whose writings
he obviously alludes), Sates argues that TV was not an enabling
vehicle of identification with King; but, rather, a terrifying
reminder of Gated own utter helplessness in the face of danger.
The very presence of a TV in his parents' house simultaneously
forced Gates, even as a very young boy, to watch acts of genocide
against blacks (here represented as one might represent a sports
event or a war fought overseas) and disclosed what the white world
held in store for him as a black man. ' The TV was the ritual arena
for the drama of race,' he recalls. 'He watched people getting
hosed and cracked over their heads, people being spat upon and
arrested, rednecks siccing fierce doge on women and children, our
people responding by singing and marching..,. Whatever tumnult our
small screen revealed, though, the dawn of the civil rights era
could be no more than a spectator sport in Piedmont. It was almost
like a war being fought overseas. And all things considered, white
and colored Piedmont got along pretty well in those years, the
fifties and early sixties. At least as long as colored people
dldri t try to sit down in the Cut-Rate or at the Render voua Bar, or
eat pizza at Eddies, or buy property, or move into the white
neighborhoods, or dance with, date, or dilate upon white people.
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A3 in many of her essays, ID the novel Meridian published almost a decade after
King's assassination, Walker reveals that the pressing question of identity devolves upon
her coming to terms with King's death, and her assessment of the Civil Rights
Movement's political ideals and goah. From the novel's opening scene, which takes
place in the southern town of Chicokema, we are presented with the vestiges of sixties
activism: Truman Held, a former activist, arrives at the public square in his green
Volvo, and notices that although the streets are lined with people, no one is saying
anything. He tries to find out what is going on from an old black man with a broom
and learns that a non-violent protest is being staged because black children in the
community have not been allowed to see a circus exhibit except on a designated day:
"Well,* s»id the sweeper, giving Truman a guarded look as he clutched his
broom, supporting himself on it, 'some of the children wanted to get in to see the
dead lady, you know, the mummy woman, in the trailer over there, and our day
for seeing her ain't till Thursday."
Tour day?"
"That's what 1 said."
"But the Civil Rights Movement changed alt that!*
'I seen rights come and I seen 'em go," said the sweeper sullenly, as if daring
Truman to disagree {Mtridian. 19).
The combined effect of our inundation with these details is to raise the question
of whether, in fact, anything has changed as a result of King's eloquent call for direct
non-violent action: in Meridian, Walker reflects upon the Movement's i«.(:jct on
Not to mention try to get a job In the ctaft unions at the paper
mill, or have a drink at the white VFW, or join the white American
Legion, or get loans at the bank, or ju«t generally get out of
lind1 (27).
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subsequent attempts to enact the assertion of political identily--both individual and
collective—through acts of civil disobedience. The pivotal moment iothil opening scene
occurs as Truman watches Meridian, standing in the public square, staring down a tank
painted red, white, and blue and decorated with ribbons, a tank which we are told was
bought by white townspeople "during the sixties when [they] felt under attack from
'outside agitators'-ihose members of the black community who thought equal rights for
all should extend to blacks* {Meridian, II).
Meridian did not look to the right or to the f«rt- As she drew nearer the
tank, it seemed to grow larger and whiter than ever and she seemed smaller and
blacker than ever. And then, when she reached the tank she stepped lightly,
deliberately, right in front of it, ripped smartly on its carapace~as if knocking
on a door-then raised her arm again. The children pressed onward, throunh the
ranks of the arrayed riflemen up to the circus car door. The silence, as Meridian
kicked open the door, exploded in a mass exhalation of breaths, and the men
who were in the tank crawled sheepishly out again to stare.
"God!" said Truman without thinking. "Haw can you not love sonv '.<iidy like
that!'
"Because she thinks she's God," said the sweeper, 'or else she just ain't all
there. 1 think she ain't all there, myself" (Meridian, 21-22).
As an imaginative exploration of the radical potentiality and applicability of
King's theoretical framework, and as a report of the possibilities which now exist for
oppositional politics in the United States, Meridian presents us with what ail first
appears to be a bleak and startling ambiguity: as a symbol of dissent. Meridian is either
someone whom we thoughtlessly worship, as does Truman; or she is someone whom we
dismiss, as the old sweeper does, as harboring grandiose and insane delusions about
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herself and Utopian prospects for political community in America.
Walker's acme awareness of the inadequacy of the symbol-making process 10
enact real changes in society and in the way people see the world is evident in her
description of the circus exhibit in the public square which is the focus for Meridian's
act of disobedience. The circus wagon, we are told, contains the mummified body of
a woman who was killed by her husband. Henry, for the crime of adultery. The
uncontrollable darkening of the mummy's skin-the irrepressible question of whether
the body on display is in fact the body of a black woman-calls our attention to the
significance of the "representative" body in the performance of disobedience. Although.
like King. Walker is acutely aware that Meridian's entry into the public realm is
necessarily complicated by the fact or her racial visibility. Walker's critique of King's
model of civil disobedience inheres in her vivid detailing of the complications that both
race and lender present for the construction of Meridian a* a 'representative" American
Self, a Self whose representative qualities would-as we have seen in the case of
Emerson, Thoreau, and King-have otherwise contributed to the formation of political
community and established a mandate for a call to collective action.
There is clearly « world of difference between Walker's recorded response to
King as a representative civil disobedient-a man whose life, by her own description,
"seeming bigger and more miraculous than the man himself, because of all he had done
and suffered, offered a pattern of strength and sincerity I felt I could trust" ("The Civil
Rights Movement: What Good Was It?" 124)-and Truman's response to Meridian's act
of disobedience as Walker depicts it in her novel. This crucial difference demonstrates
Walker's recognition of the political necessity, but also the insufficiency, of Emersonian
"representativeness* ai a rhetorical position from which to articulate Meridian's demand
for social change. Meridian's invisibility and lack of access to the public realm; her
Goldman 41
incapacity to deploy a symbolic vocabulary of the body that publicizes the claims or
conscience and promotes real change* in society, all reflect Walker's concern over the
fact that, in the wake of the sixties, symbolic action has increasingly resulted in a
disobedient1* loss of control over the production of meaning. On a public level, thiii has
meant that the symbology of disobedience has been dismissed, or emptied of its radical
significance and appropriated for the promotion of dominant cultural norms. On a
private or individual level. Meridian's attempt to inherit King's philoiophy-to find »
proper mode of public action and a standard of revolutionary conduct she can live
by-is made even more difficult by Truman's jaded, willful ignorance:
Then you think revolution, like everything else in America was reduced to a
fad?* [asked Meridian.]
*Of course," said Truman. "The leaden were kilted, the restless young were
bought off with anti-poverty jobs, and the clothing styles of the poor were
copied by Seventh Avenue....
"But don't you think the basic questions raised by King and Malcolm and the
rest still exist? Don't you think people, somewhere deep inside, are still
attempting to deal with them?"
"No," said Truman.
"Is there no place in a revolution for a person who cannot kill?* asked
Meridian, obviously not believing him.
"Why do you drive yourself crazy over these questions?" asked Truman, leaning
over her. 'When the time comes, trust yourself to do the right thing."
"The 'right thing?' Or merely the thing that will save my life?"
"Don't nitpick* [Meridian, 189).
At the end of Meridian, Walker presents us with an image of Truman's own symbolic act
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thai expresses his sympathetic comprehension of Meridian's, and thus King's, lire work:
Truman climbs into Meridian's sleeping bag and puts her cap on his head. But this is
a questionably disobedient gesture at best-and the urgent, but as yet uncertain matter
of precisely what effective civil resistance should look like; and how we can know when
we are, in fact, doing the right thing is left open for future examination.
